This paper develops a model of the nurse/physician authority relationship presented in an earlier issue of this journal, and responds to criticisms raised against that model in commentaries on that article. Specifically, I examine the discrepancy which exists between medical knowledge and nursing education, and show this discrepancy to be a difference in type, not quality. The implication is that improvements in nursing education will not affect the authority relationship between physician and nurse. To affect this relationship the nature of nursing education must change.
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In a recent article published in this journal (1) , I offered a model for understanding the duty of a nurse to carry out physician orders when conflicts of judgment arise between physician and nurse. In this paper, I would like to reply to two criticisms of my model of physician authority which have subsequently been published in this journal, in the hope that my reply might help to illuminate and clarify the model I offer. The first criticism, raised by Louise de Raeve (2) , questions the basis of physician authority which I propose, and specifically questions the type of authority which this basis implies. The second criticism, raised by Patrick Nash (3) , questions the virtue of my model as a device for understanding the limits of physician authority. In its place, Nash offers a model which is supposed to be 'simpler and less contentious'. Let medical treatment) is pre-empted in an authoritative manner by the orders of a physician, a proper model should take a more 'minimalist' interpretation of authority, a model which de Raeve cites from Raz's work as well. On this interpretation, a nurse will not defer decision until she forms her own judgment. Once such a judgment is formed by nurses, 'professionally they are compelled to use it'. Therefore, de Raeve concludes, the argument I offer in which the nurse's judgment is pre-empted (within certain limitations based upon her skills and education) must be rejected.
One note on de Raeve's presentation of the 'minimalist' interpretation in Raz: while Raz does in fact present this position in the passage quoted by de Raeve, in the next paragraph Raz soundly rejects this position (quite convincingly, I think) as an inadequate model of authority precisely because it 'assumes that people are never bounded by authority regarding issues on which they have firm views' (4), when in fact people are bounded by authority in many such cases. This has extremely important implications for de Raeve's view that an increase in medical opinions on the part of nurses will threaten the authority relationship between physician and nurse. While improvements in nursing education will indeed likely increase opinions on the part of nurses concerning medical treatment, the deferment to physician authority will still be justified in the setting of the medical centre.
I think it important that de Raeve agrees in part with my position by conceding that 'where the discrepancy between medical and nursing knowledge remains, an authoritative relationship has to persist'. For the very ability to form the judgments necessary for the 'minimalist' interpretation de Raeve favours requires that there not be a wide discrepancy between the judgments the nurse is trained to make and the orders which she is to evaluate on the basis of these judgments, otherwise she could not make these evaluations well. Evidently, where ' patronizing'). Rather, it is concerned with the type of knowledge which nursing education is concerned with, and its difference from the type of knowledge which is the concern of the medical education of physicians. Each type of education is designed to enable each professional to do different things. It is a simple fact that the professional education of physicians and nurses is different in this regard, and this difference says nothing about the quality or amount of education each receives. My belief (stated in my earlier paper) that the education of the nurse is a 'complex and sophisticated education' is sincere. The discrepancy between medical and nursing knowledge, however, is a discrepancy in type. No improvement in the quality of nursing education will change this, as the quality of nursing education is simply not the issue.
To undermine the basis of physician authority, the nature of nursing education must change (in a way which dissolves the discrepancy in the type of education nurses and physicians receive). On this point, let us consider the introduction of nurse prescribers. De Raeve repeatedly refers to the introduction of such nurses as a problem for my model of physician authority. These nurses, de Raeve points out, will inevitably have considerable pharmacological knowledge, and this knowledge will 'impinge' on the physician's authority over the prescription of medication. Because these nurses will be trained to make evaluations about what medication should be prescribed, they will not defer judgment to the physicians in any but the 'minimalist' interpretation of authority.
I agree with de Raeve on two points. One, nurse prescribers (when introduced) will inevitably have considerable pharmacological knowledge. And two, because they will have such knowledge and be trained to make decisions concerning what medication is best, they will not have reason to accept a model of authority in which their judgment is pre-empted on this issue. This is entailed by my own model of physician authority, which justifies appeal to the (pre-emptive) authority of the physician on the basis of the fact that the physician is trained to make decisions concerning what treatment is best, and the fact that the nurse is not. If a nurse prescriber is to prescribe medication, she must surely be trained to make evaluations about what medication is best. This training is something which nurses do not currently undergo (at least not as part as their training to be a nurse), and will surely change the relationship between physicians and nurses who undergo this training.
However, while nurse prescribers will surely rise in number (they are bound to, since there are none at the present), there is no reason to believe that they will dominate the profession. As I pointed out in my previous paper, different nurses undergo different training within their profession. This fact is why there are distinctions between Registered Nurses (RNs), Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs), nursing technicians, etc. That some nurses will undergo a different type of training and become nurse prescribers will not change the fact that many (indeed, I would expect the vast majority of) nurses will not be qualified to become nurse prescribers. There are good reasons to believe this. First, the extra education which will surely be required in order to be qualified to be a nurse prescriber will offer a disincentive to nurses to get this qualification unless there are identifiable gains to be had from obtaining it. Thus, nurse prescribers will surely find certain 'roles' which they will fill (roles which offer these incentives), and nurses who are either unable, unwilling, or uninterested in filling these roles will not undergo the additional education. Within the medical centre, these roles will surely be much more limited than the roles for more traditional nurses. This is so because a) the medical centre will have to pay nurse prescribers more; b) nurse prescribers will nevertheless in all likelihood find more lucrative employment outside the institution of the medical centre; and c) the daily operation of the medical centre will surely be less complicated when roles are more clearly defined, thus providing incentive for medical centres not to fill traditional To be fair, we might overlook specific differences in contractual relationships and maintain that all contractual relationships between medical professionals and hospitals contain certain implied fundamental obligations and relationships. This, however, would require a basis or establishing these fundamental features of the contractual relationship between medical professionals and hospital, which is independent of the actual contracts; one which states that no matter what the specific content of these contracts, the relationship between medical professionals and hospitals must contain the presumption of these fundamental obligations. And here, a purely contractual understanding of the nurse's obligation to carry out a physician's orders would be incomplete. It still needs an understanding of when the implied contractual relationships and obligations hold, and when they do not. Nash tells us that a nurse's duty to question a physician's order may '... from time to time be essential to fulfil the duty of trust to the employer which rules out behaviour likely to undermine his business'. But the most specific model he offers for identifying when these times arise, consists of nurses exercising 'their best judgment as to the reasonableness and safety of treatment' so as to not 'damage the employer's business'. This will surely require greater specification of what considerations are relevant for assessing, particularly, 'reasonability', which leads me to a much deeper issue concerning the contractual model for understanding the relationship between physician and nurse.
Even if the contractual relationship between physician, nurse and hospital could be understood in a way which resolved the above problems, a much deeper issue remains. Specifically, Nash's model might provide a way to address the question of whether there are limits to the nurse's obligation to carry out a physician's orders, but it fails to provide a way to identify the specific circumstances when these limits are applicable. That 
